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Abstract 
 This article analyzes the contractual relationship between a wine cooperative 
(winery) and its member (growers). This relationship is plagued by moral hazard 
and adverse selection problems in grape quality. Indeed, growers can be 
opportunistic since the cooperative is unable to observe: (i) their effort level due to 
imperfect monitoring technology; (ii) their productive abilities (types) due to 
adverse selection. Because the growers’ vineyard practices and efforts are one of 
the main determinants of grape quality, the cooperative implements an incentive 
compensation system to induce growers to provide the maximum effort towards 
quality. This compensation scheme is similar to that in tournaments (Lazear and 
Rosen, 1981; Green and Stokey, 1983; Knoeber, 1989; Prendergast, 1999). In our 
case, the cooperative promotes competition between growers by offering a 
promotion, while, at the same time, organizing the contest by creating homogenous 
groups of growers using a menu of contracts and monitoring through regular visits 
to the vineyard. Using a database of 1219 contracts, we test the effect of: (i) the 
cooperative’s tournament compensation scheme; (ii) the menu of contracts and 
monitoring mechanism. The results of our econometric estimations provide some 
confirmation of both effects. (JEL classification: L14, D82, Q13) 
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1  Introduction 
Growers’ vineyard practices are one of the main determinants of grape quality1. But wineries face 
a classical agency relationship with its growers. That is, the cooperative’s (winery) interest is for 
growers to deliver quality grapes. However, two problems arise: first, wineries are unable to 
observe the grower’s effort level (moral hazard). Their remuneration is based only on proxies, i.e. 
observable indicators, of the grape quality once delivered to the winery. Second, the growers have 
different ability and productivity (adverse selection). 
In this paper, we study a wine cooperative in the South West of France that implements an 
incentive compensation system to induce growers to provide the maximum effort towards quality. 
To do so, it sets a differentiated payment system and a system of promotions. Compensation is 
not based on the absolute quality of their grape, but instead on a relative performance scheme, 
where the individual output is compared to that of their peers. This compensation scheme is 
similar to that in tournaments (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Green and Stokey, 1983; Knoeber, 1989). 
In our case, the cooperative promotes competition between growers, first by promising the 
possibility for a grower to be “promoted” to a higher quality contract, and second by providing a 
price differential within each quality contract, an additional incentive for growers to search for 
higher prices. At the same time, the cooperative needs to face the adverse selection problem by 
organizing the competition between different homogenous groups. For this, the cooperative 
proposes a menu of contracts and monitors the production process.  
Our empirical results from a database of 1219 contracts confirm that the tournament 
mechanism aims to: (i) provide some incentives in presence of a common shock that may affect 
all the growers; (ii) reduce the heterogeneity among the growers embedded in the same contest 
depending on the contract chosen.   
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a short overview of the theoretical 
approaches when agency problems are at stake in the production of quality grapes and tournament 
theory. Section 3 describes the wine cooperative’s contract stages and the organization of our 
database. Results are presented in Section 4. The last section brings some concluding remarks. 
                                                
1 In this article we focus on grape quality. Wine quality is going to be determined by the quality of grapes but also 
the technological choices involved in the wine-production process (Gergaud and Ginsburgh, 2008) 
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2  Quality incentives and contracts 
While explicit contracts in the wine grape production have been largely used between 
independent growers and wineries (Gaucher et al., 2002; Goodhue et al., 2003; Fraser, 2005; 
Fares, 2009), in this paper we focus on cooperative organizations where the growers are both 
suppliers of the grapes and members of the cooperative. The cooperative faces a classical agency 
relationship with its growers (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Pennerstorfer and Weiss, 2013). In the case of cooperative-grower, or principal-agent, “one party 
[grower] has an informational advantage over another [cooperative] that can be exploited to the 
benefit of the advantaged party” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The first kind of asymmetric 
information is the adverse selection problem, where the grower is supposed to know his 
characteristics, skills and competencies (his type) but the cooperative cannot observe them 
without cost. To overcome the problem of adverse selection, the cooperative offers a “menu of 
contracts”. If the menu is well-designed, the grower may reveal his type by choosing the contract 
that maximizes his utility. The second kind of problem is the moral hazard problem, where the 
cooperative cannot observe the effort in grape quality undertaken by the grower once the contract 
is signed. Therefore, the contract offered by the cooperative has also to give incentives to effort. 
An optimal compensation scheme based on the observable output is defined. When the grower 
has some risk aversion, this optimal compensation scheme is confronted with the “incentive 
versus insurance” trade-off (Sappington, 1991). In this case, a piece rate mechanism (with a fixed 
base pay) can be optimal.  
In practice, the vineyard contract relationship departs from this simple model since the output 
(quality) itself is costly to monitor (Gaucher et al., 2002). First, there are no easy ways to control 
(thus, enforce) the grower’s vineyard practices. Even if the cooperative’s technicians visit the 
vineyard during the year and provide extension services, the actual work in the vineyard is not 
observed. Second, there is no easy ex post evaluation of the output (grape quality), although there 
are tests based on pre-established parameters, such as sugar contents (Alston et al., 2011), or the 
sanitary and physiochemical proprieties of grapes that could indeed provide some indication 
(Montaigne et al., 2007). However, they do not directly reflect the grower’s effort level. Finally, 
there is no “mechanical” relationship between the application of specific vineyard practices and 
the qualitative end result of grapes. Elements related to the pedoclimatic environment of land 
blocks or yearly meteorological conditions could influence the output attributes (Ashenfelter, 
2008; Ashenfelter and Storchmann, 2010). 
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In cases where monitoring is either unreliable or costly, tournaments could be a desirable 
incentive scheme (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). This compensation system remunerates individual 
performance not on the absolute value of their output, but on the position their output ranks 
compared to that of their peers. In what follows, we characterize the efficient solution of a 
compensation scheme piece rate (2.1), before analyzing the specificities of a differentiated 
compensation scheme, where agents can be heterogeneous (2.2). 
 
2.1  Agency problems and piece rate compensation scheme 
The timing of the relationship between the cooperative and the grower is defined as follows. In 
the first period, the cooperative offers a menu of contracts and the grower chooses the contract 
that maximizes his expected utility. In the second period, given the contract chosen, the grower i 
undertakes an investment or effort level ei  that increases his performance, i.e. the quality qi of the 
grape produced (output). Developing investment or exerting effort is costly to the grower and 𝐶 𝑒! = 𝜃!𝑒!!/2 denotes the cost of investment or effort, with 𝜃! the grower ability or productive 
parameter.  Quality may also be impacted by a common shock (𝜂) and an idiosyncratic shock (𝜀!). 
The shocks follow an i.i.d. normal distribution with mean zero, and the common shock has a 
variance 𝜎!! while the idiosyncratic shock has a variance 𝜎!!. The quality production function can 
be written as follows  𝑞! = 𝑒! + 𝜂 + 𝜀!         [1] 
 
The cooperative cannot observe the grower’s effort and thus cannot assert the extent to which 
the quality produced (or some of its proxies) is due to effort or to shocks, either common or 
idiosyncratic.  
In the case where a piece rate contract can be used to remunerate growers (Lazear and Rosen, 
1981; Gibbons, 1987), the growers are paid based on output (quality). Because output  is 
dependent on effort 𝑒!, a piece rate contract should encourage greater effort and penalties could be 
applied if the observed output is insufficient. Following Lazear and Rosen (1981), we suppose for 
ease of exposition that growers are risk neutral and free entry in a competitive output market set 
the value of the product at V per unit. Let ri be the piece rate, then the grower net income 𝑟!𝑞! − 𝐶(𝑒!). A risk-neutral grower chooses ei to maximize his utility 
qi
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 𝐸 𝑟!𝑞! − 𝐶 𝑒! = [𝑟! 𝑒! − 𝐶 𝑒! ]   [2] 
 
The first order condition of this program is 𝑟! = 𝑒!/𝜃!, i.e. the piece rate equates the marginal 
cost of effort. Since the cooperative is also supposed to be risk neutral, its expected profit is 𝐸 𝑉𝑞! − 𝑟!𝑞! = (𝑉 − 𝑟!)𝑒!. Because the free entry assumption implies 𝑟! = 𝑉, substituting in [2] 
and deriving gives 𝐶! 𝑒! = 𝑉      [3] 
That is, the marginal cost of effort equals its social return. The optimal effort level is then 𝑒!∗ = 𝜃!𝑉. This result suggests that piece rate is an efficient compensation scheme. However, 
since it is costly and difficult for the cooperative to directly measure the grower absolute level of 
each grower’s output2, it can be more efficient to observe the relative position of each grower by 
ranking the different output levels (Prendergast, 1999). 
 
2.2  Tournaments and relative compensation schemes 
The wine cooperative’s differentiated payment system studied in this paper is like a tournament. 
Tournaments remunerate individual performance, not on their absolute value, but on the position 
of their output ranking compared to that of their peers. The literature on tournament (Lazear and 
Rosen, 1981; Green and Stokey, 1983; Knoeber, 1989) shows the cases where the principal 
promotes competition between agents because monitoring of output itself is either unreliable or 
costly. In our case, the cooperative creates incentives to work harder first by promising the 
possibility for a grower to be “promoted” to a higher quality contract and, second, by providing a 
price differential within each quality contract that provides an additional incentive for growers to 
work harder for a better quality. 
Promotions are used to sort workers based on their talents and reward them accordingly 
(Rosen, 1982). In a tournament system, the winning prize is a promotion, which should be an 
incentive for the agents to improve their effort level (Prendergast, 1999). Lazear and Rosen 
(1981) were the first to study this type of payment system. In the presence of high monitoring 
costs, with regards to effort and final output, this type of payment system is preferred because it 
                                                
2 As mentioned above, sanitary and physico-chemical proprieties are not completely objective measurements of 
quality. 
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would be less expensive to observe the relative position of agents with regard to each other than 
to measure their individual production levels. Green and Stokey (1983) and Nalebuff and Stiglitz 
(1983) deepened the analysis by considering that tournaments are particularly preferred when the 
agents are confronted with a common shock (random variable that might represent economic 
conditions that affect all of the agents). As stated in Tsoulouhas and Marinakis (2007) and 
Tsoulouhas (2010), when agent production activities are subject to common shock individual 
performance is not a sufficient statistic for individual effort. The performance levels obtained by 
the rest of the agents convey an informative signal about the common shock and, thus the effort 
choice of any given agent. Therefore, tournaments constitute a move closer to the first best 
solution because the principal uses the available information more efficiently. By removing 
common uncertainty from the responsibility of agents, and by charging a premium for this 
insurance, the principal increases his profit without hurting the agents. 
To give an intuition of the main result of the tournament mechanism, we follow the Lazear 
and Rosen (1981) simple model where the two agents (growers) are rewarded for their 
performance with one of two prizes, 𝑡!  𝑜𝑟  𝑡!, where 𝑡! > 𝑡!. The higher prize 𝑡! goes to the 
grower with the better performance, while the lower prize goes to the poorer performing grower. 
The probability of a grower i wining the higher prize depends positively upon his own effort (𝑒!). 
Let P be the probability of winning the tournament3, the expected payoff to grower i is 
P ei( ) t1 −C ei( )"# $%+ 1−P ei( )( ) t2 −C ei( )"# $%= P ei( ) t1 − t2( )+ t2 −C ei( )    [4] 
Assuming risk neutrality and holding the opponent’s action constant, grower i will choose 𝑒! 
to maximize [4]. By deriving the grower payoff with respect to 𝑒!,  the first order condition is 𝑃!(𝑒!) 𝑡! − 𝑡! = 𝐶′(𝑒!). In a symmetric Nash equilibrium, where grower j reasons similarly to 
grower i, the effort level implemented is 
   𝑒 = (𝑡! − 𝑡!) !!!        [5] 
This implies that effort depends positively upon: (i) the marginal effect of effort on the 
probability of winning (P’); and (ii) the prize differential (𝑡! − 𝑡!). This latter implies that effort 
is unaffected by changes in the absolute level of prizes that leave this differential constant4. This 
price differential mechanism of the tournament provides protection to growers against common 
shocks. Indeed, if these shocks are systematically applied, universally boosting or decreasing 
production signals do not change the rankings between growers, and thus their expected payoff. 
                                                
3 Which could be the probability of a promotion as in Heutel (2009). 
4 As shown in Prendergast (1999), effort should also increase in the efficiency of monitoring. 
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This tournament mechanism can achieve the efficient solution (𝑒 = 𝑒∗) by choosing a prize 
differential such that  𝑡! − 𝑡! = [!!!]       [6] 
This result shows that tournament mechanism can also achieve an efficient outcome when the 
growers are risk-neutral. When they are risk averse, this efficiency result cannot be obtained with 
piece rates and tournaments due to the trade-off between incentives and insurance. When there are 
no common shocks and only idiosyncratic shocks, the piece rates do provide an improvement 
over tournaments. In contrast, relative pay in tournaments may yield greater effort than pieces 
rates when a common shock is sufficiently large (Tsoulouhas and Marinakis, 2007). 
The empirical papers on tournaments that studied the North American broiler production 
industry, confirm the theoretical predictions (Knoeber, 1989; Knoeber and Thurman, 1994). They 
find that: (i) the extent of this payment depends on the grower’s relative performance with regard 
to others (measured by the grower’s settlement cost compared to an average); (ii) changes in the 
level of prizes that do not change the prize differentials motivate no change in chicken production 
(and thus, farmer effort). Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990) provide also interesting empirical 
confirmation of tournament’s effect on the effort of competitors through their analysis of 
professional golfers. Main et al. (1993) show that promotion from corporate vice-president to 
president generates a pay increase, which is positively correlated to the number of vice-presidents 
competing for the position. That is, the executive pay is the prize of a tournament rather than 
compensation for value added. Eriksson (1999) presents similar findings by regressing firm 
performance (log (profit/sales)) by pay differentials (the gap between CEO and VP pay), 
controlling for industry and firm-size. His pay differential yields a statistically significant 
coefficient, which gives some evidence of the main prediction of the theory. 
 
2.3  Organizing the contest between heterogeneous growers 
In the previous simple models the growers were supposed homogenous. In practice, growers may 
be heterogeneous and thus each one will respond differently in the tournament to the prize 
differential and/or promotion. That is, growers with high cost of effort may choose zero effort 
because of their competitive disadvantage; or they can take excessive risks in hope of leaping 
ahead of the frontrunner. Therefore, when agents are heterogeneous relative performance 
evaluation via tournaments exposes agents to uncertainty about the average agent ability. The 
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rationale is that, unlike piece rates, tournaments filter away common uncertainty from the 
responsibility of agents who pay a premium for this insurance. Since tournaments expose agents 
to the idiosyncratic shocks of other agents, so that tournaments become less desirable when the 
variance of the distribution of ability types (heterogeneity) is large (Tsoulouhas and Vukina, 
2001; Tsoulouhas and Marinakis, 2007). 
This problem of adverse selection in tournaments has been documented first by Lazear and 
Rosen (1981) who show that without a specific mechanism, agents would not self-select since it is 
more interesting for all agents to be in the high ability group. Consider the simple case of two 
different types of growers, who know their type (ability) but the cooperative does not. There are 
two leagues: league 𝜃! wich yields the most efficient outcome given the high ability people and 
league 𝜃!, which yields the highest outcome given low ability growers. The problem is that 
league 𝜃! is strictly prefered since it generates a strictly higher payoff. This leads to the lower 
type 𝜃! contaminating league 𝜃! which results in a mixed “league” bag of growers of different 
abilities. That is, growers have no incentive to sort themselves in the two leagues according to 
their abilities.  As shown above, this “league composition risk” (Tsoulouhas and Vukina, 2001) 
may lead to inefficiency since growers will provide less effort and or take more risks. Bull et al. 
(1987) found that there is a large variance in tournament settings in the effort levels, and despite 
introducing more information such as the opponent’s effort levels, there is still much variance. 
Starting from this early experimental tournament paper, several lab experimental studies examine 
the relationship between effort provision and heterogeneity. For example, Tsoulouhas et al. 
(2007), Gurtler and Harbring (2010) and Vandegrift and Yavas (2010) find support for the 
prediction that equilibrium effort is lower in asymmetric tournaments because reduced effort does 
not change player’s relative position. However, Eriksson et al. (2009) show that previous 
experimental evidence regarding the variability of effort in tournaments is misleading because the 
experiments have not accounted for sorting. That is, agents typically choose to participate in a 
tournament. So, they used a similar setup to that of Bull et al. (1987), except that the participants 
had a choice when they participate: they can choose between piece rates and relative pay. They 
find that those who choose the tournament provide, on average, higher effort. After running the 
experiments, they also did a questionnaire with several lottery decisions to elicit the risk aversion 
of each participant. They found that risk adverse agents tend to choose the piece rate scheme. This 
sorting leads to two homogeneous groups, which reduces the between subject variance 
dramatically in the tournaments.  
Another solution to sort between heterogeneous agents is to offer a menu of contracts.  
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Following Bhattacharya and Guasch (1988), Riis (2010) shows that when agents are 
heterogeneous ex ante and the optimal discriminatory prize premium is non-monotonic in ability, 
efficiency can be restored if agents choose from a menu. Wang and Jaenicke (2005) show that a 
menu of two contracts may also simultaneously shift surplus from low to high ability growers. 
Further, a “cream-skimming” contract that pools only growers above a certain ability level may, 
under certain circumstances, increase the expected utility of participating growers and reduce the 
expected profit of the Principal (processor). In contrast, Tsoulouhas (2013) shows that no menu of 
contract is needed ex ante since the ex post tournament mechanism can sort between growers if 
they are known to be not very heterogeneous.  
In our case, the wine making cooperative tries to screen the growers by their ability and 
organize contest in subgroups where growers can be the less heterogeneous possible. This is done 
in two steps. First, ex ante growers are screened and reveal their type by choosing the contract 
that maximizes their expected utility in the menu of contracts offered by the cooperative. Second, 
before harvest and contest, the cooperative may downgrade growers and their land blocks that are 
unable to achieve a minimum quality inside their group. This help to reduce the variance of the 
outcome inside group once the harvest is done. Once this problem of heterogeneity is solved, the 
tournament mechanism is probably the best alternative when common shock is sufficiently large. 
Indeed, it eliminates the variations of revenues caused by factors common to all growers, either 
variations of measurement or variations related to the environment. This is particularly true in the 
case of cooperatives, which are delimited to a geographical area making it more likely for 
growers to be affected by climatic hazards. Tournaments should also reduce the cost related to 
measuring performance and maintain incentives for maximum effort, while removing common 
shocks to all participants5.  
3  Data and methods: the case of the Saint Mont vineyard 
The Saint Mont vineyard6, as well as the studied cooperative7, has experienced a transformation 
process similar to that of other cooperatives in the French “South West,” going from a mass wine 
                                                
5 In contrast to what is usually analyzed in the literature, we observe that the cooperative adopts cardinal, two-part 
piece rate tournaments, rather than on rank order tournaments. The rationale is that tournaments based on rank, with 
prespecified prizes, are informationally wasteful if performance levels can be measured cardinally rather than 
ordinally (Holmström, 1982). 
6 The Saint Mont vineyard is located in the far west of the Gers department, in the Midi Pyrénées Region. The Saint 
Mont designation, which was Appellation d’origine Vins délimitées de qualité supérieur (Designation of Origin 
Delimited Wine of Superior Quality. AOVDQS, for its acronym in French) and recently upgraded to Appellation 
d’Origine Protegée (Protected Designation of Origin, PDO. AOP, for its acronym in French), comprises an 
extension of 1,112 hectares and 194 wine growers (INAO, 2010). 
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production to a more quality-focused production. This shift has translated into a payment system 
that guides producers towards medium and long-term planning and strongly encourages them to 
make effort in quality of grapes (Chiffoleau et al., 2007). In this section, we present the different 
steps of the contractual process from the moment a grower chooses a contract to the arrival of 
grapes to the cooperative after harvest. This information is registered in the cooperative’s 
traceability database, which allows for a better management, and monitoring, of the grape 
production. We test in this database (i) the efficiency of the cooperative’s tournament 
compensation system, i.e. if a promotion have a positive effect on effort and thus on final 
qualitative output; (ii) the effect of the monitoring mechanism and menu of contracts on the 
efficient contest organization. . 
 
3.1  The timing of contracts 
The contractual process begins in April of each year (see figure 1), when growers commit one or 
more land blocks to a quality contract until September, when the grape harvest takes place.8 
In step 1, the cooperative offers a menu of contracts <A,B,C>. The quality requirements and the 
cost of each contract is such that the grower’s profit represented by . These 
contracts, to which the grower has committed one or more land blocks, have certain requirements 
that must be followed. At this step, the cooperative takes some preventive measures to screen 
among heterogeneous growers and land blocks. For example, to commit a land plot to contract A, 
the land blocks should belong to a property 9 or they must have been committed to an A contract 
for the previous three years. 
  
                                                                                                                                                         
7 The studied cooperative, Plaimont Producteurs, is a group which resulted from the “merge” of Plaisaince, Aignan 
and Saint-Mont cooperatives in the Gers Department. Plaimont Producteurs is composed of approximately 1,000 
producers who work in 5,300 hectares of vineyards. It produces 36 million of bottles, which are sold worldwide 
every year, and generates annual revenues of 64 million Euros (27 million correspond to exports) and employs 150 
people. 
8 After conducting interviews with the cooperative’s technicians, site visits and reviewing documents provided by the 
cooperative, we were able to analytically reconstruct the contractual process. 
9 In French called château or domaine 
ΠA ≥ ΠB ≥ ΠC
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Figure 1: Steps of the wine-grape production contract. 
 
Steps 2 and 3 consist of visits from technicians to evaluate, validate and guide the work of the 
grower. These visits are part of the “monitoring” process, which aims to avoid moral hazards, or 
hidden actions such as non-compliance with the contract.10 In doing so, the cooperative can 
screen again between growers. Indeed, by monitoring the cooperative aims to ensure homogenous 
groups before harvest and contest. 
If everything occurs according to the plan, the grower that made all of the necessary efforts 
and complied with the contract should produce a better quality grape than the one that did not. 
However, land plot characteristics (e.g., location, pedoclimatic conditions) may not be aligned 
with the desired quality. Consequently, if a plot committed to certain contract did not correspond 
to its potential – in our example, land that is not suitable for an A contract – all efforts made by 
the grower would end up being pointless because he could be penalized after the qualitative 
analyses. On the contrary, if the land has a greater potential, with only a little effort from the 
grower the analysis results could show a high-quality wine.11 
Nonetheless, the risk, especially regarding land potential, would raise one problem regarding 
tournaments. If agents know – or believe they know – of the high potential of their land, they 
could make a little effort and with high-quality production, finish at the top of their tournaments. 
On the contrary, those who consider that they own “low-potential land” will make little effort to 
remedy their situation because they will conclude that their land is going to be downgraded 
anyway. 
                                                
10 This, of course, will not rule out opportunistic behavior, such as making a maximum effort to show compliance 
before visits, but it should provide a good indication of the cooperative’s control, monitoring and enforcement of 
contracts. 
11 The issue with land potential could partially come from adverse selection, but in reality this “potential” is not 
actually known neither by the cooperative or the grower. 
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In step 4, a committee composed of growers and technicians proceeds to classify – and 
eventually downgrade – the various land blocks (see figure 2). This classification helps the 
cooperative to determine the quality of grape that will arrive to their facilities after harvest and 
foresee the type of remuneration that the grower will receive. For example, a land block engaged 
in an A contract (at this step) is downgraded to B or C because the requirements of the contract 
were not met.12 
 
  
Figure 2: Classifying and downgrading wine-grape land blocks. 
 
This constitutes a crucial moment because the fulfillment of the contract is verified. For 
instance, if the grower engages a plot of land to an A contract, he/she expects to be paid according 
to the A price scale (pA1 to pA3, see figure 2) depending on the results of the contribution 
analysis. However, if they agreed to an A contract, but find themselves with several land block 
downgraded to C1 or C2, this will heavily penalize their compensation because they will only 
have the right to opt for prices pC1 to pC3. 
There is an additional feature in the payment system (a contractual provision). The 
compensation to each land block is a function of the price and the yield of all land plots within the 
                                                
12 The difference between the C1 and C2 classification in figure 2 corresponds to quality C grapes for producing red 
wines (C1) and rosé (C2). 
13 
contract, but there are ceiling levels in terms of yield (as a measure of quality).13 In the case of a 
contract A (tournament A), a grower’s compensation (prices pA1 to pA3) will only be paid up to 
a yield of 45 hectoliters/ha. After breaching that ceiling, yield will be paid at a price pc 
(complement price), which is close to 1/5 of pA114.  
The penalty for surpassing the fixed yield ceiling, and incurring in a loss, is another incentive 
for additional effort. The contract, especially for high-quality contracts (A and B), stipulates a 
mode of cultivation that needs strong management of the expected yield. For instance, the process 
of disbudding and pruning the vine is very costly in terms of working hours and differs from one 
contract to another.15 This means that a grower engaged in contract A will not only play in a 
tournament A, but he/she must also be careful of their yield and should provide the maximum 
effort to manage the yield within the respective ceilings. In any case, growers can appeal the step 
4 decision (step 5). 
In step 6, samples are taken, and three ripeness tests are carried, in order for the cooperative’s 
technicians to allow the harvest of grapes. This evidences the authority mechanism the 
cooperative applies, which could differ from the grower’s interests, who for instance, could prefer 
to harvest in another moment. In step 7, samples of each contribution are analyzed and a 
corresponding score is calculated in accordance with its group average quality. In step 8 the 
remuneration is made according to the final classification (result of the tournament) and to the 
ceiling criteria in terms of the yield set in the price scale. 
 
3.2  The database 
The main database, referred to as “Geowine StMont” database, contains two types of information 
from different sources. The first type comes from the wine cooperative’s traceability database.16 It 
contains information on each grower’s individual contribution of grapes since the year 2000. It 
provides detailed information on each grape contribution (e.g., yield, grape variety), 
characteristics of each land block, the type of contract engaged, the land block’s classification (at 
                                                
13 In viticulture lower yields are related to higher quality. 
14 Up to 66 hectoliters/ha, which is the maximum yield allowed by the AOP’s regulation. After this ceiling it is all 
losses. 
15 The cooperative estimates that there are approximately 1600 euros/ha in between contracts A, B and C. 
16 Traceability systems make information available on products’ attributes and transformations that can be used to 
improve safety and quality (Galliano and Orozco, 2011). Beyond the record-keeping information to respond to a  
public authority inquiry, the cooperative uses this information to improve their productive and management 
systems. 
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step 4) and the final compensation category. These data are further complemented by information 
provided by the cooperative, such as the price paid for each compensation category and individual 
information about growers, such as age, gender and total arable land surface. The second source 
comes from the work of researchers at the École d’Ingénieurs de Purpan (Gay, 2010). These are 
geographic variables such as soil, altitude, slope and orientation exposition.17 
The test is carried on a sample of 1219 land blocks belonging to 120 growers. Summary 
statistics and definition of variables are presented in table 1. 
3.2.1  Variables 
The analysis was performed using data from the 2008 harvest. The main reason for this choice is 
that, after 2007, the different contracts became more differentiated in terms of quality 
requirements, but in 2007, many vines were damaged by environmental factors (hail storms). In 
addition, we only take into account the grape production for red wines because they have three 
contract types (instead of two for whites) and they represent almost 80% of all grape production 
in the Saint Mont AOP. 
Our dependent variable, REMTOT, is the payment for each land plot provision of grape (in 
thousands of Euros for each hectoliter/hectare). This payment does not include the costs 
subtracted by the cooperative for the actual wine production but is an indication of the quality of 
grapes because the price paid to each land block depends upon the quality category it was 
assigned to after the downgrading process (step 4) and upon the price category after analysis (step 
7). The type of contract initially chosen by the grower can be A (Contract A), B (Contract B) or C 
(Contract C). The requirements in quality are higher in contract A than contract B and higher than 
C. These dichotomous variables will be used for the selection equation. 
The first group of independent variables concerns the prediction of the tournament model 
and the contractual provisions. The possibility of a promotion to a higher quality category should 
have a positive effect on the provision of quality effort. The probability of promotion increases 
with the number of promotions offered and decreases with the number of contestants (Heutel, 
2009). We consider the dummy variable PROMO that equals one if the land block has been 
promoted from the previous year (t−1 to t). It could indicate that the grower wants to prove that 
                                                
17 This work was carried out by the researchers from the “École d’Ingénieurs de Purpan”, as part of the WP1 of the 
Geowine project. These data concerned geological characteristics (mainly soil type) comes from the BRGM 
(Bureau de Recherche Géologique et Minière) of the Midi-Pyrénées region, while those concerning the topography 
(altitude, slope, and orientation) come from a numeric image of the region’s landscape (Gay, 2010). 
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he/she deserved the promotion. Inversely, we consider a dummy variable DEMO that tests if the 
land plot has been demoted from category from the previous year. 
Furthermore, we consider a variable to capture the monitoring activity of the cooperative. 
Tournament theory indicates that the higher the monitoring efficiency of the principal, the higher 
the effort from the agent should be (Prendergast, 1999). The variable DOWN indicates the land 
block has been downgraded at step 4 (figure 1) during the season (in year t). As previously 
mentioned, at this stage, a committee of growers and technicians (from the cooperative) evaluate 
the grower’s work and determine if the contract has been followed. If this is the case, the plot of 
land remains in the same quality category; if not, the land block is downgraded to a lower quality 
category. In addition, this variable only takes into account the downgrading of a land block where 
the grower’s effort did not meet the contract specifications (moral hazard). It does not take into 
consideration land blocks downgraded due to a climatic event or a disease to the vine.18 The 
variable EFFCD indicates whether a land block suffered from a climatic or a disease event. 
The variables YIELD and YIELD2 consider the average yield of each individual land block. 
The yield is measured in hectoliters/hectare and is relevant because, in viticulture, higher quality 
is associated with lower yields. The squared of yield, YIELD2 will allow us to observe if, after a 
certain ceiling, an additional unit of yield would have a negative effect on quality. The control of 
yields is probably the most important provision in quality contracts in viticulture. Concerning the 
grower, we take into consideration the grower’s age (AGE), gender (GEND) and the number of 
year of experience in a type A contract (NYA). We also consider the percentage of vines over 
total arable land (VINEYARD), which signifies the degree of specialization of the grower in 
viticulture. 
Finally, we consider variables related to the fixed characteristics of the land plot. The 
variable PROPERTY indicates that the land plot belongs to a chateau or a domaine. SURF refers 
to the land plot’s total surface (in hectares). TANNAT indicates whether the variety of grape is 
Tannat or not.19 The variable SOIL, which has five classes, that is, four types of soils representing 
74.3% of all land blocks and one class, considered “out of the zone”, representing the remaining 
land blocks. The four types of soil are mainly those with high presence of gravel, clay, molasse 
and iron-rich sand. 
 
                                                
18 In such cases, growers are compensated with a low price for their grapes by the cooperative, but they also receive a 
compensation from their insurance independently from the cooperative (not known in our study). 
19 Tannat is the main variety of the Saint Mont AOP. By regulation it must account at least for 60% of the final wine 
(INAO, 2010) 
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 [Insert table 1] 
 
4  The empirical model 
In this section, we outline the empirical analysis. The two main objectives are, first, to test the 
efficiency of the cooperative’s tournament compensation scheme system, in other words, to test 
that a promotion has a positive effect on effort (and thus on final qualitative output). Second, to 
test for the efficiency of the screening/selection mechanism to reduce heterogeneity among 
growers and blocks. 
We estimate that the qualitative performance of land plots, thus grower’s effort, is going to be 
dependent of their initial choice of contract. The choice of a specific contract (step 1 of the 
processes) by growers depends on the characteristics of the land block, the grower’s experience 
and the performance of previous years. Thus, we test the existence of a selection bias since the 
effort level of growers is likely to depend on the type of contract there in. The choice made by the 
grower seems to be sequential, since he/she first chooses a contract to its land block, either A, B 
or C, and then he/she chooses his level of effort that in a certain extent defines the total 
compensation associated to the land block.  
The first part is a binary outcome equation that models the probability of accepting a contract 
i, i=A, B, C. The probability of accepting a contract i can be described as follows 
 Si* = x1'β1 +u1    (6) 
 
where  
 
 
 
 
The binary decision Si  to choose a contract i is modeled as the outcome of an unobserved 
latent variable Si* , and we observe that the contract is adopted ( Si =1) when Si* > 0 . It is assumed 
that Si*  is a linear function of the exogenous covariates x1  and a random component u1 . 
 
 
 
otherwise 
Si =
1 if
0 if
!
"
#
$
#
Si* > 0
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The second part uses linear regression to model the total compensation obtained by the land 
block, given the decision on contract adoption. This can be expressed as 
      (7) 
where π is the total compensation for the land block, x2  is a vector of exogenous explanatory 
variables and u2  is a random component. Since the error terms u1  and u2  are supposed to be 
uncorrelated, then the two parts are assumed to be independent and are usually estimated 
separately. This can be however viewed as a restriction on the model. Indeed, if the land-blocks 
generating a positive compensation are not randomly selected from the population, after 
controlling for regressors, then the results of the second-stage regression suffer from selection 
bias. 
In what follows we use the Heckman (1979) selection model, where the possibility of such 
selection bias is considered by allowing for possible dependence in the two parts of the model. 
That is, let the latent variable π *  denote the total compensation obtained by the land block, where 
the compensation is observed when π *>0. In contrast to the hurdle model, π *  is observed only 
when Si* > 0 . In such model, the errors u1  and u2  are possibly correlated and have a bivariate 
normal distribution with zero means and covariance matrix: 
 
 
Since the error u1  in (6) is believed to be correlated with the outcome variable, we need to 
correct for this bias by finding variables that are associated with holding a contract i, but are not 
associated with the outcomes of contract j. 
The two-step method of estimation is based on the conditional expectation 
     
 
 
     (8) 
        
π = x2' β2 +u2
σ ρ
ρ 1
!
"
#
#
$
%
&
&
E π x,Si* > 0( ) = x2' β2 +E u2 Si* > 0( )
= x2' β2 + ρλ x1'β1( )
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The method is as follows: (i) first estimate the probit equation by maximum likelihood to obtain 
estimates of . For each observation in the selected sample, compute the inverse of the Mill’s 
ratio or the non-selection hazards λˆ = φ x1 ' βˆ1( ) /Φ x1 'β1( )  where  and Φ are the standard normal 
density and distribution functions respectively; (ii) estimate  and  by least squares 
regression of π on x and . For more robust identification, we also impose exclusion restrictions, 
which requires that the selection equation have at least one exogenous variable excluded from the 
outcome equation. In our estimation, we use the variable PROPERTY since it has some effect on 
the selection and does not directly affect the compensation. With this exclusion restriction, we 
have  which may reduce the collinearity problem between the variable  with other 
regressors  in the compensation equation. But since this problem in the two-step method of 
estimation generates higher standard errors than those of the maximum likelihood estimation 
procedure, we use also use this procedure. 
 
5  Results and interpretation  
Results from the second step of the Heckman model are presented in table 3. In addition, we 
present marginal effects of probit and OLS regressions for each contract in table 2. 
In the probit results we obtain the factors explaining the choice of a contract (4.1). In the 
second step of the Heckman models, the factors explaining the qualitative performance of land 
blocks (4.2). The first group of variables in our regressions correspond to tournament mechanisms 
and contract provisions, then those related to the harvest, growers’ characteristics and finally to 
land block characteristics. 
 
5.1  The determinants of contract choice 
The results from the probit model (table 2) show the factors associated with the choice of each 
one of the quality contracts. For contracts “A”, model 1, our results show that four variables may 
explain this choice. First, the fact that the land block has been promoted from year t−2 and the 
number of years that the grower has been engaged in A contracts (NYA), but also the fact that the 
land block belongs to a property, and that the grape variety is TANNAT. The variable NYA 
β1
φ
β2 βλ = ρσ
λˆ
x1 ≠ x2 λ x1' βˆ1( )
x2( )
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reflects a reputation effect, or experience, but only related to such high quality contracts. Generic 
experience, usually captured with an age variable is not significant, at least for high quality 
contracts. 
The fact that high quality contracts are associated with a property is not surprising. First, 
because it is a requirement in order to get into a high quality contract. Second, because it means 
that grapes from one property will only be mixed together in making the wine and bottled at the 
property. Finally, the use of TANNAT is also expected because is the main variety of the Saint 
Mont AOP and is the one preferred for the production for high quality wines. 
For contract “B”, we found a negative and significant effect of age (between 21 and 35 years 
of age) and the number of years with an A contract. It seems that in this case young growers are 
less likely carry type B contracts, instead they will start with less demanding type C contracts. It 
also seems that more years of experience in A contracts, the more likely the grower will continue 
to choose A or B contracts. In addition, the wineries to which the growers belong play a 
significant role in the type of contract they choose. Belonging to “Cave de Saint Mont” winery, 
determines in part the choice of B contracts, while those belonging to “Aignan” and “Plaissance” 
winery are more likely to choose C contracts. With regards to the characteristics of land blocks, 
we found several factors explaining this choice: the size of the land block (SURF) and the grape 
variety (TANNAT). 
 
[Insert table 2] 
 
 
We found opposite results for the selection of “C” contracts, a negative effect of promotion, 
age (young growers), NYA (number of years in A contracts), grape variety (TANNAT) and 
PROPERTY. It seems that the cooperative takes some measures, defined in the specifications 
chart, to screen growers in their contract choices. 
 
5.2  The efficiency of the wine grape tournament  
In this section we discuss the factors explaining the qualitative output of grapes, measured by the 
dependent variable REMTOT, that is, the compensation paid to a grower for an individual land 
block. In table 2 we show the results for OLS regressions for all types of contracts. However, we 
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make the assumption that the qualitative performance of land blocks, thus grower’s effort, is 
going to be dependent of their initial choice of contract. Therefore, we will discuss here the 
results of the second step of the heckman models, in which we account for this selection bias 
(table 3). 
Using STATA’s two-step method for Heckman models, we automatically obtain the inverse 
Mills’s ratio. Using the maximum likelihood method, we obtain a test of chi2 that verifies that rho 
is significantly different from zero Rejecting the null hypothesis means that both equations are not 
independent from each other. The results of the maximum likelihood, as well as the two-step, 
Heckman’s model show, first of all, that the correlation between the two equations is significant 
only for the choice of C contracts. It is not the case, however, for contracts A and B. 
The compensation system is organize so that a grower’s performance could be taken into 
account by the cooperative in order to “promote” the land block to a higher quality category, or to 
“demote” it to a lower category. In models 8 and 11, we observe that once a land block has been 
promoted (PROMO) to this category (from the previous year), it shows a positive and significant 
effect on its compensation (on its quality result). For quality B contracts, being promoted to this 
category does not have a significant influence on final output. However, the fact that the land 
block was demoted (DEMO), meaning that the previous year it was engaged in a higher quality 
contract, plays a positive and significant effect for C contracts. This could be interpreted as the 
fact that growers will exercise greater effort in order to be again promoted, or to “return”, to the 
higher quality they once were. 
  
[Insert table 3] 
   
The monitoring variable, DOWN, has a negative and significant effect for all three contract. 
This means that the more the cooperative was able to identify and downgrade land blocks that are 
not complying with the contracts’ specifications, (step 4, figure 1). Having chosen an A contract, 
and then being downgraded at this stage will translate in loss of proximally 2 644 euros for the 
grower. This variable does not include the downgrading of land blocks affected by a climatic or a 
disease incident; such effects are captured by the variable EFFCD, which has a logical negative 
effect on the final output. A similar effect is found in models 9-11 and 12-13, that is in the choice 
of contracts B and C. 
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As presented in section 3.1, the ceiling, in terms of yield, imposed on the cooperative’s 
specifications (an additional contractual provision) is both an incentive for maximum effort and a 
penalty. The quality of grapes is related to a controlled (and fixed) ceiling of yield. But, because 
the price paid being a function of yield, we have a positive and significant effect for the variable 
YIELD. However, this relationship becomes negative (variable YIELD2) once a certain ceiling is 
breached. 
The results of Models 8 through 13 indicate that the yield rule has the same result, regardless 
of the type of contract engaged in. We show this relationship between qualitative output and yield 
in figure 3. We notice a slight difference between high-quality A contracts and the rest. High 
quality A contracts are associated with low yields and high compensation. However, for quality B 
and C contracts, the penalties for exceeding the yield ceilings are less dramatic than that of A 
contracts. The behavior, at least in terms of respecting yield, is similar whether the initial contract 
is a B or a C. 
  
 
Figure 3: Land block’s compensation by yield. 
 
With regards to the growers’ characteristics, age seems to have a role in quality output. 
Growers with more that 45 years old produce higher qualitative output for contract B that other 
growers. However, the experience of the grower in high-quality “A” contracts (NYA) plays a 
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positive role on the qualitative output for contracts C (model 13). This result could mean that the 
more experience a grower has in stricter high-quality contracts, the more likely he is to do better 
in terms of quality effort. Overall, this result could mean that once a grower is used to the 
exigencies of high-quality specifications, it is more likely that he/she will apply those “good 
practices” to all their contracts. It seems that being specialized in viticulture (VINEYARD) has a 
negative influence the qualitative output of grapes, for those growers having choose B contracts. 
There is also, a slight positive effect for growers engaged in A contracts that belong to the “Cave 
d’Aignan” winery. 
As for the characteristics of the land block, the main grape variety (TANNAT) plays positive 
role in compensation for contracts A through C. In fact, tannat is the main variety of the Saint 
Mont AOP and is the one preferred for the production of high quality wines. Quality is thus 
highly associated with grape variety. 
Finally, with regards to the land block’s pedoclimatic environment, we tested the influence of 
type of soil in which the land block is located, on final qualitative output. We found that high-
quality contracts (Model 11) carried on Molasse soils are likely to increase by 390 euros the 
compensation of such contract, all things being equal. Without any expertise in agronomy or 
viticulture, we are not able to explain the relationship of this type of soil and the final qualitative 
output of grapes. However, if we infer that a positive relationship exists between this type of soil 
and the qualitative output of A contracts, it would have some management implications for the 
cooperative. First, it would mean that some types of soils are better fitted for carrying certain 
modes of cultivation (quality contracts) than others. This can be used by the cooperative to replant 
their vines or to reallocate the contracts proposed to growers to improve the overall quality of 
grapes. Second, it could also raise doubts about their incentive tournament system. In fact, 
growers owning land blocks within “rich” soils could have an advantage, regardless of their 
effort, compare to their peers and thus provide limited effort. 
 
6  Conclusion 
In this paper, we have focused on the relationship between a wine cooperative and its member-
growers and the incentives mechanisms implemented to produce quality grapes. The 
cooperative’s traceability database provides information to decision makers to better manage the 
production of quality grapes, which we used to test our hypotheses on the data from the 2008 
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harvest. More precisely, we show how a wine cooperative in the south west of France uses a 
differentiated payment system and contractual provisions, where promotion (or demotion) to 
(from) higher quality contracts works as an incentive for efforts to improve quality. This incentive 
system is similar to that of a tournament. In addition, the wine cooperative screens the growers by 
offering a menu of contracts and by monitoring their activities. The first screening mechanism 
takes place when the grower chooses the contract. The access to high quality contracts is 
explained by the cumulated experience on higher quality contracts and previous promotions, but 
also by the fact that land blocks belongs to a property or the grow of a specific grape variety: 
Tannat. Age of growers appears as a detriment to access high quality contracts, as youngster start 
with lower quality contracts. 
Testing the tournament system itself, we found that promotion and demotion from quality 
engagement in previous years are significantly influences of quality performance. Once someone 
have been demoted from the previous year, he/she will exercise greater effort in order to be again 
promoted, or to “return”, to the higher quality they once were. Monitoring plays a big role in the 
tournament system, as the decision whether to downgrade a land block of wine grapes to a lower 
quality when the minimum quality may not be achieved, can reduce the tournament mechanism 
efficiency. Finally, yield control act for all three types of contracts as both an incentive for 
maximum effort and a penalty.  
Our results confirm that the tournament mechanism built by the cooperative aims at achieving 
two objectives: (i) providing incentives in presence of common shock that may affect all the 
growers; (ii) reducing the heterogeneity among the growers embedded in the same contest in 
order to increase the incentives provided by the tournament compensation scheme. This paper 
contributes to the tournament and contract literature in viticulture by showing that relative 
performance compensation systems, with the possibility of being promoted to higher quality 
contracts, is an incentive for growers to provide higher effort levels.  
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Table 1 : Summary statistics and description of variables 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N 
REMTOT Compensation of individual land block (thousand of Euros/ha)  4.758 1.609 0.114 9.141 1219 
PROMO Dummy variable, = 1 if land block have been promoted from 2007-2008 0.020 0.139 0 1 1219 
DEMO Dummy variable, = 1 if land block have been demoted from 2007-2008  0.015 0.121 0 1 1219 
PROMO07 Dummy variable, = 1 if land block have been promoted from 2006-2007  0.019 0.136 0 1 1219 
DEMO07 Dummy variable, = 1 if land block have been demoted from 2006-2007 0.011 0.103 0 1 1219 
DOWN Dummy variable, = 1 if downgraded from its quality category during year t  0.154 0.361 0 1 1219 
Contract A Dummy variable, = 1 if initial engagement in contract A 0.046 0.209 0 1 1219 
Contract B Dummy variable, = 1 if initial engagement in contract B 0.175 0.380 0 1 1219 
Contract C Dummy variable, = 1 if initial engagement in contract C 0.779 0.415 0 1 1219 
YIELD Average yield of land block (in hectoliters/ha)  54.472 14.390 9 147 1219 
YIELD2  YIELD^2 3174.056 1752.526 81 21609 1219 
EFFCD Dummy variable, = 1 if a climatic or disease incident 0.060 0.237 0 1 1219 
AGE_21-35 Dummy variable, = 1 if grower's age (21 to 35 years old) 0.068 0.252 0 1 1219 
AGE_36-45 Dummy variable, = 1 if grower's age (36 to 45 years old) 0.331 0.471 0 1 1219 
AGE_46-55 Dummy variable, = 1 if grower's age (46 to 35 years old) (in reference) 0.355 0.479 0 1 1219 
AGE_>56 Dummy variable, = 1 if grower's age (more than 56 years old) 0.246 0.431 0 1 1219 
GEND_F Dummy variable, Grower's gender (= 1 if women)  0.171 0.376 0 1 1219 
AGE_>45*F Dummy variable, = 1 if woman over 45 years of age  0.125 0.331 0 1 1219 
NYA Number of year in contract A 2.564 2.147 0 5 1219 
VINEYARD Grower's viticulture surface/total arable land 0.237 0.164 0.013 0.736 1219 
WINERY_1 Dummy variable, = 1 if grower belongs to Cave of Plaisance  0.192 0.394 0 1 1219 
WINERY_2 Dummy variable, = 1 if grower belongs to Cave of Aignan 0.291 0.455 0 1 1219 
WINERY_3 Dummy variable, = 1 if grower belongs to Cave of St. Mont (in reference) 0.517 0.500 0 1 1219 
PROPERTY Dummy variable, = 1 if land block is located within a domaine 0.109 0.312 0 1 1219 
SURF Logarithm of a contract's total surface in ha 0.425 0.206 0.022 1.407 1219 
TANNAT Dummy variable of grape variety (=1 if Tannat)  0.577 0.494 0 1 1219 
Soil       
Gravel (Presence of) Gravel Ancient Alluvium  0.072 0.259 0 1 1219 
Clay (Presence of) clay (or Argiles bigarrées in French)  0.179 0.383 0 1 1219 
Molasse (Presence of) Molasse 0.244 0.429 0 1 1219 
Out of the zone Out of the zone (in reference) 0.276 0.447 0 1 1219 
Sand (Presence of) iron-rich sand (or Sables fauves in French)  0.230 0.421 0 1 1219 
Source: Geowine StMont database (Gay, 2010), 2008 harvest. 
Table 2:  Determinants of contract choice and compensation 
 Probit results (M.E.) OLS results 
 Dependent variable: type of contract Dependent variable: REMTOT (land plot compensation) 
 Contract A = 1 Contract B = 1 Contract C = 1 if all contracts  if contract A  if contract B if contract C 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
PROMO       0.073 (0.194) 0.462 (0.244) -0.048 (0.210)   
DEMO           0.447 (0.695) 0.895*** (0.231) 
PROMO07 0.152* (0.067) 0.461*** (0.106) -0.698*** (0.075)         
DEMO07 0.021 (0.049) -0.088 (0.074) 0.061 (0.082)         
DOWN       -0.706*** (0.075) -2.631*** (0.372) -1.319*** (0.124) -0.313*** (0.081) 
Contract A       2.919*** (0.163)       
Contract B       1.009*** (0.059)       
YIELD       0.125*** (0.006) 0.245*** (0.049) 0.131*** (0.009) 0.119*** (0.007) 
YIELD2       -0.001*** (0.000) -0.002*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) 
EFFCD       -2.947*** (0.117) -6.677*** (0.405) -3.888*** (0.183) -2.502*** (0.107) 
AGE_21–35 -0.005 (0.026) -0.082* (0.034) 0.094* (0.037) -0.014 (0.079) 0.171 (0.263) -0.175 (0.238) -0.018 (0.077) 
AGE_36–45 0.006 (0.016) 0.037 (0.029) -0.032 (0.030) 0.002 (0.061) 0.046 (0.223) -0.064 (0.118) 0.024 (0.066) 
AGE_>56 -0.003 (0.015) 0.007 (0.028) 0.002 (0.029) 0.013 (0.060) 0.115 (0.221) 0.248* (0.116) -0.033 (0.063) 
GEND_F 0.010 (0.028) -0.025 (0.051) 0.010 (0.054) -0.193 (0.112) -0.367 (0.317) -0.200 (0.205) -0.119 (0.106) 
AGE_>45*F -0.005 (0.030) 0.029 (0.069) -0.018 (0.069) 0.141 (0.137) 0.166 (0.371) -0.047 (0.284) 0.147 (0.136) 
NYA 0.016*** (0.004) 0.012* (0.005) -0.025*** (0.005) 0.038*** (0.011) 0.017 (0.056) 0.018 (0.025) 0.039*** (0.012) 
WINERY_1 0.004 (0.017) -0.060* (0.026) 0.059* (0.029) 0.007 (0.063) 0.102 (0.164) -0.015 (0.144) -0.048 (0.068) 
WINERY_2 -0.009 (0.013) -0.057* (0.024) 0.064* (0.026) 0.102 (0.057) 0.311 (0.183) 0.167 (0.119) 0.013 (0.061) 
TANNAT 0.071*** (0.010) 0.137*** (0.021) -0.203*** (0.021) 0.371*** (0.050) 1.633*** (0.450) 0.416** (0.139) 0.262*** (0.051) 
VINEYARD -0.025 (0.050) 0.066 (0.071) -0.021 (0.079) -0.164 (0.146) -0.519 (0.475) -0.778* (0.316) -0.033 (0.149) 
SURF -0.021 (0.029) 0.117* (0.050) -0.093 (0.054) -0.030 (0.120) -0.362 (0.311) 0.135 (0.253) -0.074 (0.133) 
PROPERTY 0.110** (0.037) 0.004 (0.038) -0.106* (0.046)         
Gravel 0.014 (0.027) 0.022 (0.048) -0.032 (0.050) -0.066 (0.099) 0.361 (0.270) -0.321 (0.210) -0.009 (0.098) 
Clay -0.000 (0.017) 0.060 (0.038) -0.060 (0.038) 0.086 (0.072) 0.161 (0.190) -0.130 (0.157) 0.091 (0.078) 
Molasse -0.003 (0.016) 0.048 (0.032) -0.041 (0.033) 0.064 (0.061) 0.327 (0.218) -0.014 (0.119) 0.092 (0.065) 
Sand -0.003 (0.016) 0.056 (0.034) -0.049 (0.034) 0.021 (0.068) 0.212 (0.212) -0.089 (0.126) 0.090 (0.073) 
Constant       -0.419* (0.210) -0.939 (1.390) 0.714 (0.370) -0.375 (0.227) 
Observations 1219  1219  1219  1219  56  213  950  
R2       0.778  0.956  0.872  0.720  
Adjusted R2       0.774  0.930  0.858  0.714  
Pseudo R2 0.234  0.102  0.165          
BIC 475.93  1142.23  1202.91  2948.40  124.07  508.47  2184.04  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. M.E.: Marginal effects.  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001	  
Table 3: Efficiency of compensation system with sample selection 
 Heckman results Twostep method Heckman results ML method 
 Dependent variable: REMTOT (land plot compensation) Dependent variable: REMTOT (land plot compensation) 
1st step contract choice: Contract A Contract B Contract C Contract A Contract B Contract C 
 (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
             
PROMO 0.457* (0.186) -0.026 (0.202)   0.458* (0.189) -0.025 (0.159)   
DEMO   0.458 (0.662) 0.872*** (0.213)   0.457 (0.318) 0.792*** (0.191) 
DOWN -2.645*** (0.303) -1.314*** (0.118) -0.315*** (0.080) -2.644*** (0.191) -1.313*** (0.112) -0.315*** (0.069) 
YIELD 0.245*** (0.040) 0.131*** (0.008) 0.119*** (0.007) 0.246*** (0.031) 0.131*** (0.009) 0.119*** (0.008) 
YIELD2 -0.002*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) -0.002*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) 
EFFCD -6.700*** (0.334) -3.888*** (0.175) -2.499*** (0.106) -6.700*** (0.326) -3.890*** (0.174) -2.480*** (0.103) 
AGE_21-35 0.200 (0.200) -0.143 (0.226) 0.011 (0.078) 0.199 (0.297) -0.140 (0.247) 0.084 (0.116) 
AGE_36-45 0.041 (0.180) -0.084 (0.117) 0.008 (0.065) 0.040 (0.163) -0.087 (0.115) -0.033 (0.072) 
AGE_>56 0.130 (0.170) 0.248* (0.110) -0.039 (0.063) 0.129 (0.146) 0.248* (0.121) -0.056 (0.072) 
GEND_F -0.375 (0.250) -0.177 (0.200) -0.128 (0.108) -0.375 (0.207) -0.175 (0.215) -0.158 (0.138) 
AGE_>45*F 0.149 (0.300) -0.072 (0.275) 0.156 (0.138) 0.150 (0.283) -0.074 (0.266) 0.185 (0.165) 
NYA 0.001 (0.046) 0.013 (0.024) 0.031** (0.012) 0.002 (0.052) 0.013 (0.025) 0.010 (0.017) 
VINEYARD -0.518 (0.368) -0.784** (0.303) -0.061 (0.150) -0.518 (0.389) -0.786* (0.321) -0.129 (0.183) 
SURF -0.358 (0.238) 0.099 (0.235) -0.115 (0.135) -0.358 (0.267) 0.094 (0.241) -0.221 (0.150) 
WINERY_1 0.095 (0.137) -0.015 (0.137) -0.033 (0.069) 0.095 (0.189) -0.015 (0.147) 0.011 (0.079) 
WINERY_2 0.297* (0.141) 0.185 (0.115) 0.031 (0.061) 0.297* (0.149) 0.187 (0.124) 0.082 (0.072) 
TANNAT 1.603*** (0.360) 0.353* (0.140) 0.197*** (0.053) 1.604*** (0.251) 0.347* (0.142) 0.024 (0.095) 
Gravel 0.353 (0.213) -0.337 (0.202) -0.017 (0.099) 0.354 (0.234) -0.339 (0.193) -0.040 (0.117) 
Clay 0.139 (0.170) -0.164 (0.158) 0.078 (0.077) 0.140 (0.215) -0.168 (0.155) 0.040 (0.087) 
Molasse 0.337* (0.165) -0.041 (0.120) 0.081 (0.066) 0.336 (0.176) -0.043 (0.142) 0.047 (0.075) 
Sand 0.186 (0.175) -0.118 (0.123) 0.073 (0.072) 0.187 (0.169) -0.122 (0.139) 0.028 (0.082) 
Constant -0.711 (1.404) 1.030* (0.457) -0.361 (0.226) -0.721 (0.997) 1.065* (0.537) -0.332 (0.257) 
rho       -0.244 (0.529) -0.239 (0.242) 0.319** (0.109) 
mills -0.082 (0.159) -0.160 (0.182) 0.803** (0.252)       
N 1219  1219  1219  1219  1219  1219  
Censored obs 1163  1006  269  1163  1006  269  
Uncensored obs 56  213  950  56  213  950  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 	  
